34 PAPER TRAIL, YOU BE THE JUDGE. Judge DAVID CAMERON

“PAPER TRAIL”

YOU BE THE JUDGE

ljhljhlb

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND CA305/2013

BETWEEN JACOBUS VAN DER LUBBE

Appellant

AND THE QUEEN

Respondent

Counsel: Appellant in person

Crown Law Office for Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPLICATION TO VARY OR AMMEND THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Dated the 10^th day of March 2014.

Presented for filing by:

Jacobus van der Lubbe

Appellant

22A Paterson Street

Wanganui 4500

AMMENDED GROUNDS FOR APPEAL

10/03/2014

1 At my first appearance and at almost all of my subsequent appearances Judge David Cameron displayed a very hostile and biased attitude, which showed bad faith and partiality. (Lawyer Debbie Goodlet witnessed first appearance.)

2 Also at my first appearance Judge Cameron refused my request for a reasonable timeframe to prepare my defence.
3 When I made an Application for a reasonable time to prepare extension Judge Cameron refused it. (Show Application.)
4 Then when I Applied to the High Court for a review of Judge Cameron’s decision not to allow me reasonable time to prepare my defence he backed down and vacated the early trial date. His earlier oppressive stance was nothing less than bullying and displayed the same cynical indifference to my legal rights that the NZ Police have displayed since 1984. (Show High Court Application.)
5 At one preliminary hearing Judge Cameron asked me how many witnesses I intended to call and to name them, which I did; I was sick with the flu at the time and thought that I had to do that because the Judge requested it, and Judge Cameron and the Crown Prosecutor wrote down the names I gave.
6 Later I made an Application that Judge Cameron stand down from the case because I believed he was biased against me and that I would not get a fair trial if he was in control but he refused to do so and then attempted to intimidate me from presenting a vigorous defence by writing the following,

(9) “Mr van der Lubbe. I will say to you now. I expect you to conduct yourself with proper decorum throughout this trial, and that includes not interrupting a Judge when he is making a decision, and if you do not conduct yourself with proper decorum, you can expect me to hold you to account and I do not think that would be necessarily in your interest in front of a jury. So you will show proper courtesy and respect to the Court process throughout this trial.” (Show Judge Cameron’s negative “Oral Decision” and Judge Clapham’s words of praise.) ADD THE BIT ABOUT HIS “AS LATE AS FRIDAY” CRAP AND THE CURRENT CANTERBURY STAND DOWN DEBATE HERE.

1. 7 I had arranged with Court staffer Rodney Newport that he would have a defibrillator in the Court House on trial day and he said he would arrange it. I made this request because I suffer from stress-induced arrhythmia. On trial day I asked Judge Cameron if the defibrillator was on hand he replied, “We’ll get one in if the need arrises.” Judge Cameron obviously doesn’t know that a defibrillator’s function is to revive an already incapacitated person who will die if not revived immediately. If Judge Cameron is aware of the machines purpose and functions then his dismissal of my request showed a callas disregard for my health and safety. Judge Cameron’s refusal of my bone fide request that a defibrillator be on hand caused me to be more anxious and stressed. Subsequent events (my heart attack) prove that my health concerns at the time of trial were well founded. (Show “Acute Infarction” document.)
3. 8 I had also arranged with Rodney Newport that on trial days I was to be allowed to use the electronic TV screens to show my defence photos and documents to the jury, Mr Newport said, “The prosecution does, so I don’t see why you can’t.” But that request was also refused by Judge Cameron and Deputy Court Registrar Carol Brookie without good reason, which prevented me from presenting my defence properly. Judge Cameron dismissed my request with, “I don’t think it’s sufficiently important for that to occur.” Another example of Judge Cameron’s cynical indifference to me and my legal rights. (Show the relevant portion of the trial transcript.)

9 Judge Cameron ignored Judge F W M MacElrae’s earlier decision dated 24 August 2012 that I must be allowed to try and prove that there existed a decades long pattern of maleficence by the NZ Police against my family and that the police had colluded with the so-called “victim” Stephen Poynter to try and provoke me into an unlawful act which forced me to act in self defence. Judge Cameron’s most unreasonable decision to ignore Judge MacElrae’s earlier just decision, which I was relying on for my defence, and suppressing a large proportion of my defence submissions resulted in me losing my limited concentration and threw my entire defence into disarray.

I had prepared my brief of evidence outlining the pattern of corrupt police behaviour on the understanding that Judge MacElrae’s decision was binding on all subsequent hearings. Not only was I prevented from presenting my full prepared brief of evidence to the jury, but the Court allowed me to paint myself in a very bad light before cutting me off midstream and then prevented me from presenting the follow-up evidence that demolished the despicable accusations against me that had I had just outlined. These false allegations were part of the pattern of malfeasance that Judge MacElrae alluded to in his decision of 24 August 2012. Not only did Judge Cameron ignore Judge MacElrae’s earlier decision, but when I attempted to introduce the documents that I had earlier applied to be admitted as evidence because I believed they tended to corroborate my argument that I acted only in self-defence on the days mentioned in the charges, Judge Cameron, acted contrary to what he said in [5] of his of 25 January 2013 reserved decision, “If the defendant wishes to pursue their introduction during the trial he is free to apply at that time.”, and dismissed my attempts to introduce most of them saying they were “Irrelevant.” (Show Judge Cameron’s decision.)

10 Also I had earlier turned down Judge M J Behrens QC’s offer of a 12 month good behaviour bond for a prosecution insisted guilty plea because I was confident that justice would prevail because of Judge MacElrae’s decision that I must be allowed to try to prove the police conspiracy to allow Stephen Poynter carte blanche to provoke me into a prima facie illegal act. which tended to prove that I was forced to act in self-defence under the law.

because of the Police conspiracy to deny my family protection
Judge Cameron simply refused to let me introduce evidence

3. Self-defence

31 SECTION 48 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides:

Everyone is justified in using, in the defence of himself or another, such force as, in the circumstances as he believes them to be, it is reasonable to use.

This defence recognises that people have a right to defend themselves against violence or threats of violence, so long as the force used is no more than is reasonable for that purpose. The law does not require people to wait until they have been attacked before taking action to protect themselves.

1. 11 After the jury asked a question about provocation Judge Cameron admitted that he was not up to speed with provocation’s current status and asked the Crown prosecutor for his opinion and not unsurprisingly he said that provocation could not be applied to the matter and Judge Cameron, without consulting a law book, then misdirected the jury to rule out provocation as a defence. HIS EARLIER SUMMING UP TELLS A DIFFERENT STORY ALTOGETHER. He categorically stated that provocation “is not a defence to the charges”. SEE ADDITION BELOW.

12 I GOT THIS BIT WRONG I WROTE THIS FROM MEMORY BUT MY MEMORY IN THIS INSTANCE FAILED ME.

Judge Cameron also misdirected the jury by failing to mention or rule on my claim of justification and or self defence as defences whereas Judge MacElrae had earlier mentioned justification as a defence.

I have now been supplied with a copy of Judge Cameron’s summing up and although he did traverse the provocation, justification and self-defence matters I believe he misdirected the jury when he said,

“Now if you accept Mr Van Der Lubbe’s evidence as to all that then you may well think that there is an element of he having been provoked into these actions by his neighbour. Provocation, though, is not a defence to the charges Mr Van Der Lubbe faces but if accepted could and would be taken into account in imposing any penalty should Mr Van Der Lubbe be found guilty of either or both the charges.”

Even though Judge Cameron stated that provocation should and would be taken into account, when the time came to sentencing, he did no such thing. He made no mention of me having been provoked or provocation in his sentencing speech.

And if provocation, self defence and justification were no defence to the charges I faced why did Judge F W M MacElrae’s say in his earlier decision dated 24 August 2012 that I must be allowed to try and prove that there existed a decades long pattern of maleficence by the NZ Police against my family and that the police had colluded with the so-called “victim” Stephen Poynter to try and provoke me into an unlawful act which forced me to act in self defence, if no such defences existed?

Part 3 Matters of justification or excuse

20 General rule as to justifications

· (1) All rules and principles of the common law which render any circumstances a justification or excuse for any act or omission, or a defence to any charge, shall remain in force and apply in respect of a charge of any offence, whether under this Act or under any other enactment, except so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or any other enactment.
(2) The matters provided for in this Part are hereby declared to be justifications or excuses in the case of all charges to which they are applicable.

Compare: 1908 No 32 s 40

Another question from the Jury about intent was also misdirected by Judge Cameron.

12A I will amend if necessary12A after I am provided with the transcript and DVD recording of the Judge’s answer on intent to the Jury.

13 Judge Cameron hushed me up when I tried to point out the 22 shot sounds on the Police 111 recording of 23 April 2010. I wanted to demonstrate the difference between barely audible suppressed 22 shots at close proximity and fired almost directly at me and suppressed 243 shots fired away from me at over 100 meters and heard through a closed window, the first of which woke me up from my sleeping pill induced sleep.
14 Judge Cameron refused to allow me to show the jury my police and court documents relating to Sergeant Drew Allison’s attempt at perverting the course of justice in relation to Poynter’s false allegation that I had stolen two of his cattle. (Bottom of page 91 (25) and top of page 93 down to (10) of the trial transcripts) This evidence tended to prove that Stephen Poynter with police connivance was indeed carrying out a concerted plan to get me into trouble with the law.
15 At the final pre-trial hearing both Judge Cameron and Deputy Registrar Carole Brookie told me that there were five free days for the week of the trial but then Judge Cameron refused to allow me to present my complete defence evidence because he wanted the trial to end early as he “had a flight to catch.” So there was never five free days or something came up and my case was shortened unfairly at my expense to expedite Judge Cameron’s travel plans or other matters.
16 Judge Cameron refused to let me try to prove that the Police stance that there was no evidence that my cat had been shot was false and corrupt. He refused to allow me to show the wounded cat photos, veterinarian reports and xrays to the jury.
17 Judge Cameron misdirected the jury by not telling them to bear in mind that my only motivation was to try and stop the gunfire danger posed by Stephen Poynter to my family and domestic animals. Two of the three Jury questions about provocation and intent indicate that they were looking for a way to acquit me but Judge Cameron would have none of it. He wanted me to be convicted.
18 Judge Cameron totally ignored my closing statement and went along with the prosecution case all the way. It was obvious from my first and subsequent appearances that Judge Cameron had predetermined the outcome and he did everything within and without his power to deny me a fair trial. Unlike all other adjudicators in this matter, Judge Cameron never once advised me to obtain legal counsel. Nor did he at any time show any sympathy or help me along the way, his attitude towards me throughout was dismissive, obstructive and oppressive, hence my application the he stand down or be stood down from the case. But having said that I must add that during one of the pre-trial hearings Judge Cameron, in a moment of unprecedented sympathy asked the Crown Prosecutor and me if we could try to put the matter to rest by me agreeing to a good behaviour bond or diversion but those discussions came to nought because the Crown offers to settle the matter required me to admit guilt, something that I was not prepared to do because of Judge MacElrae’s earlier decision “that I must be allowed to try and prove that there existed a decades long pattern of maleficence by the NZ Police against my family that forced me to act the way I did”, and I firmly believed that a guilty plea would have encouraged the aggressor Stephen Poynter to continue his deadly game of, how far can I push the old Dutch bastard before he finally cracks and moves off the land that I covet? It didn’t cross Poynter’s deluded mind that I would rather die (almost did) than capitulate to his aggressions.

19 At sentencing Judge Cameron continued his bullying by warning me not to interrupt him during his sentencing speech (I replied that I wasn’t a primitive) and he then continued and totally ignored my six page rebuttal to the Crown’s sentencing submissions and simply went along with the Crown’s usual misinformation. No other Judges have deemed it necessary to warn me about my behaviour in Court, quite the opposite in fact, as I said above, Judge Clapham went out of his way to congratulate me on my concise and respectful submissions. And then to compound matters Judge Cameron stated wrongly that I had asked him for a discharge without conviction. The only thing I did actually read out to him from my rebuttal he got wrong.

(He said he had read it earlier but it is obvious that he didn’t bother.) What I read to him was, “ As I said before, there is one other fair and viable alternative to trying to beat me into submission and that would be to discharge me without further penalty.” He then stated in his sentencing speech that I had requested a discharge without conviction but when I pointed out his mistake he admitted it and amended his decision. The Crown had asked for a fine of $1000 for each charge, with no mention of Court costs and that is exactly what Judge Cameron imposed. Just as he did during my trial, Judge Cameron did exactly as the Crown requested. It’s as though they are joined at the hip.

20 Misconduct by the prosecution.
21 Judge Cameron allowed Poynter to make a mockery of the Court with his repeated obfuscations, obvious lies, deflections and feigned memory losses.
That Judge Cameron turned a blind eye allowed the Crown Prosecutor Mr H Mallialieu to abuse the Court’s process by twice attempting to pervert the course of justice…… (SEE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT PAGE 5.. 5 through 25 and starts, “Now if I could take you back to August of 2011, and ends, A long time ago and they weren’t, they were just a, another occurrence. Another event.”……….by firstly, knowingly and willingly eliciting false testimony from a sworn witness (Stephen Poynter) and then again by contradicting that same witness’s true testimony with another attempt to nullify that testimony by again introducing the false notion that Poynter’s memory of what he did that day was either faulty or non existent. It is clear from the Court record SEE HIS SWORN POLICE STATEMENT, A STATEMENT THAT THE CROWN WAS FULLY CONVERSANT WITH, that Poynter did remember what happened that day, the 23rd of August 2011. He stated that he’d rung the police and told them he was intending to home kill a pig, but Mr Mallialieu then attempted to further muddy the waters with a question very similar to his earlier one, “So you wouldn’t be able to tell us exactly what you were doing-“. This time he asked Poynter, “But you don’t specifically remember that date because -“, and he asked that leading question solely to get another no answer in order to mislead the Court into accepting the lie that Poynter suffers from a noticeable form of time induced memory loss and also to make sure that Poynter was fully aware that Judge Cameron wouldn’t censure him if he continued to feign memory loss when he didn’t want to answer awkward questions during cross-examination. From that time on whenever Poynter didn’t want to answer a question with a provable lie he feigned memory loss or said, “Police will have those records.”

22 I was woken from a deep sleep by a gunshot and then used the word annoy instead of provoke because of my sleepy and stressed condition. Judge Cameron pounced upon my use of the word annoy instead of provoke, which for all intents and purposes mean the same thing anyway SHOW SYNONYMS in a clear display of bias. Page 6 of his Summing up. He ignored or twisted all my other submissions that made it crystal clear that I believed that Poynter was committing dangerous offences to provoke me, why else my repeated requests for a no fire zone or that the

Police pass on to me Poynter’s warnings to them that he was about to fire a gun? (Show Police “we never tell informant” Comms Printout.)

NEW INFORMATION, AFFIDAVIT SUPPLIED

23 My wife Sandra, who was sitting in the public gallery during the Jurie’s deliberations, told me on 2/7/13 that she saw Crown Prosecutor Lance Rowe standing by the Court door vigorously nodding to Judge Cameron after Mr Mallialieu had finished telling him that provocation could not be used as a defence in this matter. That, in anyone’s language, is surreptitious interference in and an abuse of the Court’s process.

That Judge Cameron allowed PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED

Prosecutor Lance Rowe to interfere in that way adds weight to

my contention that in my case Judge David Cameron was at all

relevant times biased in favour of the Crown. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

(Show Application

to exclude Rowe from the proceedings.)

NEW INFORMATION DUE TO LATE DISCOVERY?

24 Section 14 (1) of the Juries Act 1981 states that I, as an “eligible person”, was entitled to be provided for perusal a copy of the jury panel for up to seven days prior to the trial. When I asked Court staff to exercise that right I was refused. Initially I was told that as a layperson I was not allowed to see the list. On a subsequent visit to the Court office I again asked to see the list and I was told that I could see the list but only for a few minutes just before the jury was to be empanelled. Common sense told me that neither of the answers I was given was correct or fair so I attempted to file an Application to see the jury list within a sensible time frame. Yours truly,Jacobus Van Der LubbeWanganui 4500
22A Paterson Street,
My attempt to file my Application was rudely rebuffed by Deputy Registrar Carol Brookie and when I quietly insisted that Ms Brookie file my Application she appealed to a security guard for assistance. The security guard saw no need to intervene and Ms Brookie then realised that her justice obstructing bluff to deny me my legal right file my Application to see the jury list in good time had failed. She then angrily stamped it and took my Application away. All but my first request to see the list of jury candidates occurred during and cut into the time that I was legally entitled to peruse the panel list. Judge Cameron’s decision that I could see the list almost at the last hour was not in accordance with Section 14 (1) of the Juries Act 1981 which states that eligible persons be given access to the list for up to seven days prior to the trial. See Cameron decision dated 11 March 2013

_____________________________________________________________________

CROWN REBUTTAL SUBMISSIONS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND CA305/2013

BETWEEN JACOBUS VAN DER LUBBE

Appellant

AND THE QUEEN

Respondent

RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL

26 August 2014

CROWN LAW

TE TARI TURF 0 TE KAITAUNA

PC) Box 2858

WELLINGTON 6140

Tel: 04 472 1719

Fax: 04 473 3482

Contact Person:

M J Lillico

Email: marklillico@crownlaw.govt.nz

Jacobus Van Der Lubbe was convicted after a jury trial in the Wanganui

District Court of one count of threatening to cause grievous bodily harm’ and

one of threatening to 1611.2

Mr Van Der Lubbe now appeals against his convictions and sentence.
Mr Van Der Lubbe was sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 on each charge for a

total of $2,000.

Relevant background

Mr Van Der Lubbe lives in Wanganui with his wife. Stephen Poynter lives

next door. The properties concerned are of a semi-rural nature.

There was an ongoing dispute between the two neighbours with one of the

issues being the use of firearms by Mr Poynter. At one point, in an effort to

resolve the dispute, an arrangement was made whereby Mr Poynter would

indicate to the Police when he was about to use his firearms.

The Crown case was that on 3 August 2011 Mr Poynter rang the Police and

told them that he was going to use a firearm on his property. Mr Van Der

Lube was not advised. After Mr Poynter used his rifle Mr Van Der Lubbe

made a 111 call reporting the shots and telling the Police that someone was

shooting a gun to annoy him. The Communication Centre advised that Mr

Poynter had told Police of his intentions. At that point, Mr Van Der Lubbe,

the Crown alleged, became irate and told the communicator “…I am going to

carry out my threat now, I am going to buy my own firearm and I am going to

use it to disable my neighbour”.3

About three weeks later, on 23 August 2011, Mr Poynter advised the Police

that he was going to use his firearm on his property again. He did so but again

the information was not passed on to Mr Van Der Lubbe and at about 2.40pm

he made a 111 call advising the Police that he had heard a gunshot from his

neighbours. Mr Van Der Lubbe was advised by Police to stay inside while the

Police investigated. Mr Van Der Lubbe was telephoned by the Police a short

Contrary to the Crimes Act 1961 s 106(1)(a)

2 Contrary to Crimes Act 1961 s 306(1)(a)

3 COA p 21A

2692928 J

time later and a message was left on his answerphone advising that Mr Poynter

had contacted the Police warning that he would be killing a pig. Mr Van Der

Lubbe returned the call wanting to speak to the person he had spoken to

before. He became irritated and annoyed with the Police communications

operator. He swore at him and said “You’re just fucking useless, I’m going to

buy my own gun, I am going to kill that cunt”.4

At trial Mr Van Der Lubbe essentially relied on provocation and self-defence.

He admitted the telephone calls themselves.’

Mr Van Der Lubbe gave evidence. He explained that by making the telephone

calls he was laying a paper trail and that he wanted to be arrested so that he

could tell his story in Court and the gun shots could be stopped permanently!”

The learned District Court Judge, Judge Cameron, directed the jury that the

evidence given in the case was not sufficient to give rise to the possibility of

self-defence. In doing so the Judge pointed out that none of Mr Van Der

Lubbe’s responses on 3 or 23 August could be said to be reasonable defensive

responses to the situation Mr Van Der Lubbe believed existed at the time.’ The

Judge illustrated the point by indicating that on 3 August 2001 Mr Van Der

Lubbe told the Police Communications Centre that someone was shooting a

gun to annoy him.’ Annoyance could not possibly justify, on any objective

basis, a response by Mr Van Der Lubbe of a threat to disable the person

concerned.9

In relation to provocation, the Judge directed the jury that provocation is not a

defence to the charges Mr Van Der Lubbe faced but if accepted could and

would be taken into account in imposing sentence should he be found guilty:0

4 COA p 23A

5 COA p 107 33-34 and p 108 lines 1-4

6 COA page 111

7 COA page 168

Ibid

9 Ibid

to COA page 169

2692928_1

Appeal jurisdiction

Mr Van Der Lubbe’s prosecution was commenced by way of informations

filed on 29 February 2012 prior to the commencement of the second stage of

the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 on 1 July 2013. The appeal therefore is to be

determined under part 13 of the Crimes Act 1961.11

Suppression orders

The Crown are not aware of any suppression orders in this matter.

Appellant’s warning status

The appellant, Mr Van Der Lubbe, has no strikes recorded against him.

The appeal

The argument on appeal is essentially that the learned District Court Judge was

biased against Mr Van Der Lubbe and that accordingly there was a miscarriage

of justice. The sentence is said to be excessive in that the Judge did not take

into account the provocation Mr Van Der Lubbe alleged he had been

subjected to.

Bias

The Crown submits that the way in which the learned District Court Judge

conducted the trial would not create a reasonable apprehension about his

impartiality for any fair minded observer.12 Trial judges benefit from a

presumption of integrity which in turn encompasses the notion of impartiality.

The onus is therefore on the person alleging bias to present coherent

evidence.’

Mr Van Der Lubbe essentially relies on the Court record to make out the

grounds of his appeal. It is submitted that Mr Van Der Lubbe has not

discharged the onus on him to present cogent evidence of bias.

Rather, the picture which emerges from the case on appeal and notes of

evidence is that the Judge had to make a sequence of rulings against Mr Van

Der Lubbe because:

11 Criminal Procedure Acts 397

12 Siemer v Solicitor’-Genera/ [20101 NZSC 12 at [6]

13 R v Teske.), 2006 SCC:25 at 1191 to [211

2692928_1

18.1 Mr Van Der Lubbe sought to introduce extensive background to the

dispute with his neighbour as evidence when it was unrelated to any

available defence or matter in dispute. The rulings were against Mr

Van Der Lubbe because his position had no legal basis; and

18.2 Mr Van Der Lubbe was self-represented. Many of the interventions

and rulings made by the Judge were necessary because Mr Van Der

Lubbe chose to represent himself before the Court in a jury trial. The

Judge was entitled to intervene to maintain control of the Court room

he had an implied power to do what was necessary in the exercise

of his trial function.”

Mr Van Der Lubbe’s specific concerns can be considered as follows:

Reasonable dineframe to prepare defence

19.1 Mr Van Der Lubbe asserts that he had inadequate time to prepare his

defence and that the Judge had “an arrogant and dismissive

demeanour”.15 The onus on Mr Van Der Lubbe to present cogent

evidence is not discharged here and there is nothing in the record

before this Court to support the assertion. In any event, it seems that

the early trial date was later vacated.I6

Witnesses

19.2 The implication of Mr Van Der Lubbe’s submission on this point” is

that the Judge wrongly enquired into the names of Mr Van Der

Lubbe’s witnesses. The innuendo is that the attendance of the

witnesses was then discouraged (presumably by the Crown).18

19.3 Again, there is no cogent evidence for this and there is no reflection

in the record of this exchange. In setting the trial date the Judge may

well have sought the number or names of witnesses and may or may

not have advised Mr Van Der Lubbe that he was not required to

notify the Court if he did not want to.

‘4 See, for example, R uKelekolio [2014] NZHC 1275 at 1171

15 Appellant’s submission page 1 at [2]

16 Appellant’s submissions page 2 at [4]

17 Appellant’s submissions page 2 at [5]

2692928_1

19.4 The suggestion that the Crown then went on to discourage the

attendance of the witnesses or encouraged one of them to ‘change his

story’19 is a very serious allegation and completely without evidential

foundation.

19.5 In any event, it does not seem that any arrest warrants were sought by

Mr Van Der Lubbe when his witnesses did not attend. The

prosecutor’s note of the trial shows that at 3.10pm (on 12 March

2013) Mr Steele’s evidence concluded and that there were “3 other

witnesses.”‘ The note then states “none show up”.21 The note goes

on to say that at 3.12pm “Defence case ends” 22 No application for a

warrant to bring the absent witnesses to Court or for an adjournment

is noted as having been made. In the case on appeal it is simply noted

that the final defence witness, Mr Steele, was excused23 and the

defence case was concluded. There were no applications for warrants

or adjournments at that point.

Advice to obtain legal representation/appointment of amicus curiae

19.6 It is alleged that the Judge’s failure to suggest that Mr Van Der Lubbe

obtain legal advice or representation and his failure to appoint an

amicus curiae indicates bias. It is difficult to understand how such

failure would create a reasonable apprehension about the Judge’s

impartiality for a fair minded observer given that Mr Van Der Lubbe

already knew that he had this right24 and apparently did not want to

instruct counsel. This can be seen in that Mr Van Der Lubbe acted

for himself throughout the proceedings including:

19.6.1 A related private prosecution by Mr Van Der Lubbe of

Andrew McDonald (a Police Officer at Wanganui);25

‘8 Appellant’s submissions page 2 at 15]

19 Appellant’s submissions p2 at [5J

20 Excerpt From prosecutor’s note attached

21 Ibid

22 Ibid

23 COA page 124

24 COA page 53A at 142]

25 COA page 24A

2692928_1

19.6.2 An application by the Crown in respect of admission of

hearsay evidence;26

19.6.3 An application by the Crown to have witness summonses set

aside;27

19.6.4 An application by Mr Van Der Lubbe to have the Wanganui

Crown Solicitor, Lance Rowe, and prosecutor, Harry

Mallalieu, stand aside from acting as prosecutors at tria128 as

well as an application by Mr Van Der Lubbe to have

admitted into evidence a 111 call and various other

documents. 29

19.7 The Judge’s failure to appoint an amicus is also no indicator of bias

given that that is the orthodox position. The appointment of an

amicus in criminal cases should be rare.3° Where a defendant

indicates that he or she wishes to represent him or herself the Court

should ensure that he or she is aware of the right to counsel and of

the availability of legal aid.3’ The defendant should be afforded an

adequate opportunity to consider whether to take advantage of those

rights and to exercise them if that is what he or she wants. However,

defendants have the right to present their defences personally and that

is confirmed by section 354 of the Crimes Act 1961 and section 11 of

the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.32 If having been appropriately

advised and given sufficient time a defendant choses to self-represent,

the choice must be respected and the defendant must live with the

consequences.33 There was no amicus in the present case but that was

entirely appropriate in the light of these principles and does not

signify bias.

26 COA page 43A

27 COA page 44A

28 COA page 54A

29 COA page 55A

30 R P McFarland [2007] NZCA 449 at [53]

t Ibid

32 Ibid

33 Ibid at [54]

2692928_1

Conduct

19.8 Mr Van Der Lubbe points to the Judge’s indication that he expected

him to conduct himself “with proper decorum throughout this trial”3`

as a further indicator of bias. The Court has inherent power to

control conduct in the Court room and evidentially the Judge felt it

was necessary to give this warning. The transcript of the preliminary

part of the trial on 11 March 2013 is not available but there are

exchanges in the transcript at later points of the trial where Mr Van

Der Lubbe appears to be arguing with the Judge. The Judge was

entitled to try to control this. An example of this is at page 134 of the

case on appeal where there appear to be interruptions of the Judge by

Mr Van Der Lubbe noted in the square brackets. The same approach

was taken by Mr Van Der Lubbe in the course of giving his evidence.

An example is in the case on appeal at page 94 where the Judge rules

against allowing Mr Van Der Lubbe to show photographs to the jury

and asks him to move on to his next point.’ Mr Van Der Lubbe

retorts “so they would be grounds for appeal?”36 and goes on to say

“I think I am getting a raw deal here but I will carry on.”37 Mr Van

Der Lubbe’s conduct as a lay litigant in a jury trial was a legitimate

concern for the Judge.

Defibrillator

19.9 Mr Van Der Lubbe points to an exchange with the Judge about a

defibrillator as another indicator of bias. Again, there is no evidence

that this exchange happened in the manner alleged.

Photographs displayed on television

19.10 It appears that Mr Van Der Lubbe had not brought ‘hard copy’

versions of the photographs that he wished to refer to. Mr Van Der

Lubbe intended to use the photographs to illustrate an incident on

3 September 2011 where Mr Poynter carried out a home kill with a

rifle at the back of his property and within the Wanganui City

COA page 61A at (91

35 COA page 94 at line 18

36 Thiel at line 19

37 COA page 94 line 21

2692928 1

boundary. The photographs were of that boundary. Given that the

photographs related to an irrelevant matter the Judge’s refusal to have

them put before the jury was an orthodox response and not a product

of bias.

Previous ruling ofJudge McElrea

19.11 Mr Van Der Lubbe also sees bias in Judge Cameron’s apparent

overruling of Judge McElrea’s earlier decision that “the accused must

be allowed to show the truth of some key parts of this ‘pattern’ if he

wishes to — although it would be counterproductive — in order to

persuade the jury that he actually held that view — that it, that it is part

of the circumstances as he believed them to be.”38 Again, the Judge’s

response to this previous ruling is perfectly orthodox and cannot have

created a reasonable apprehension about his impartiality for a fair

minded observer. This is because:

19.11.1 Judge McElrea heard an application by the Crown to set

aside witness summonses not the admissibility of evidence in

support of self-defence;

19.11.2 One District Court Judge cannot bind another;

19.11.3 Judge McElrea explicitly noted that he had heard no

evidence and had made no findings on facts relating to the

self-defence argument;39

19.11.4 Judge Cameron had charge of the trial and was responsible

for the fairness of that trial. As it was, he decided that there

was no basis for a self defence argument and ruled

accordingly.°

19.12 This did not, however, mean that Mr Van Der Lubbe was not

permitted to give any evidence of previous matters and the Judge did

38 COA page 50A at [31]

39 COA page 47A at [13]

40 COA page 134

2692928 J

indulge Mr Van Der Lubbe to an extent in his evidence in chief where

Mr Van Der Lubbe gives evidence of:

19.12.4 Mr Poynter’s shooting of four of Mr Van Der Lubbe’s deer

that had escaped their enclosure;41

19.12.5 Being shot at by Mr Poytner and calling 111 on his cell

phone as he lay flat on the ground;42

19.12.6 His belief that Mr Poynter shot his cat.43

Interruption during play back of 111 call

19.13 This is presented by Mr Van Der Lubbe” as a denial by the Judge of

an opportunity to represent himself properly. A fair reading of the

transcript does not disclose any such unfair judicial interference. The

111 call is played at 12.45pre with Mr Van Der Lubbe asking the

Court whether it could hear the sound of a suppressed .22. The

Judge replied “let us just hear the whole thing and then you can

comment”.” The audio then ends at 12.50pm47 and the Judge invites

Mr Van Der Lubbe to comment at that point by saying “alright Mr

Van Der Lubber° There is then an extended and uninterrupted

passage of transcipt where Mr Van Der Lubbe comments on the

incident leading to the call for the rest of page 99 of the case on

appeal up to the beginning of page 100. This was an opportunity to

make a comment about the sound of a .22 had Mr Van Der Lubbe

wished.

Refusal to allow Mr Van Der Lubbe to show the jury Police and Court

documents

19.14 Again, this is no indication to a fair minded observer of bias. The

documents apparently related to an allegation by Mr Poynter that Mr

41 COA page 94 lines 23 to 25

42 COA page 98 lines 10 to 19

43 COA page 101 lines 22 to 28 and page 102 lines 1 to 4

Appellant’s submissions at page 8 112]

45 COA page 99 line 5

46 Ibid at line 9

47 Ibid at line 10

Ibid at line 13

2692928_1

Van Der Lubbe had stolen two of his cattle two years’ prior to the

offending at issue in the trial in 23 June 2009. While the Judge

allowed Mr Van Der Lubbe to give some evidence of this in chief’) he

did not allow him to elaborate through production of papenvork.5°

Given the irrelevance of the material he was not wrong to do so and

so the ruling is symptomatic of the extra-legal approach of the selfrepresented

Mr Van Der Lubbe rather than any bias on the part of

the Judge.

Shortening of the trial unfairly

19.15 Again, there is no evidence in relation to this matter and Mr Van Der

Lubbe has not pointed to any part of the record which discharges his

onus to present cogent evidence of bias. In any event, the close of

the defence case is detailed at paragraph 19.5 above. Arrest warrants

were not sought for the witnesses and no adjournment was sought

either. The record shows that the trial came to a close because Mr

Van Der Lubbe had called the witnesses he wanted to and there is no

indication that he was prejudiced by any concerns about time on the

part of the Judge.

Evidence that the cat had been shot

19.16 Whether or not Mr Poynter had shot Mr Van Der Lubbe’s cat in

20105′ did not give rise to a defence for threatening to kill/commit

grievous bodily harm in 2011.

Improper Crown behaviour

19.17 A further aspect of the bias alleged against the Judge was his failure to

intervene in relation to alleged misconduct by the prosecutor.52 There

was no need for the Judge to intervene at this point because there was

no misconduct. There was nothing improper in the prosecutor asking

an open question at page 5 line 9 of the case on appeal when leading

the evidence of the complainant, Mr Poynter. Mr Mallalieu asked an

open question “do you recall particular use of your firearm on that

49 COA page 91 line 25 to 30

5° COA page 91 line 30 to 35

51 COA page 101 lines 22 to 29

2692928_1

day?” in referring to 3 August 2011 (the date of the offending alleged

in count 1 of the indictment).53 Mr Poynter’s response was that he

could not recall that particular day.54 Mr Poynter gave evidence on

eradicating pests such as deer and goats on his property with a

firearm,55 on how frequently he would shoot on his property56 and so

forth. The use of firearms that was a feature of the neighbour’s

dispute was therefore squarely in front of the jury. If the evidence

lacked specificity for Mr Van Der Lubbe it was open to him to crossexamine

Mr Poynter on his previous statements.

Sentence

The fines imposed by the learned District Court Judge were well within range.
There is no tariff for threatening to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.
In Faakaga v R57 this Court said:

It is difficult to discern any consistent pattern in sentences on charges

of threatening to kill. R v Forrest is at the more serious end of the

range. A sentence of three and a half years imprisonment was upheld

on appeal. However, the circumstances were far more serious than

the present case and involved three charges of demanding money

with menaces and four of threatening to kill made while the appellant

was in prison. At the other end of the range, non-custodial sentences

have been imposed in some cases.

The Judge, in his summing up, said “if accepted” provocation would have to

be taken into account in imposing any penalty. There is no mention of the

issue of provocation as a mitigating factor in the Judge’s sentencing. The

Judge heard the evidence and may have decided that there was no provocation.

Perhaps he decided that hearing shooting in a semi rural area was not

something that could amount to provocation. Whatever the case, while it is

important to look at the construction of sentencing it is the end result that

counts .58

52 COA page 10 at [201

53 COA page 19A

COA page 5 line 10 to 11

55 COA page 3 lines 10 to 23

56 COA page 6 lines 7 to 13

57 29 September 2011, CA306/11 at [9]

58 p R [2013] NZCA 514 at [18]

2692928_1

Mr Van Der Lubbe was charged with two offences that carried seven years’

imprisonment as a maximum and had a presentence report recommending

home detention (ie, effectively prison).” While admittedly this

recommendation was well-wide of the mark it does emphasise the seriousness

of the offending. It was deliberate and pre-meditated and Mr Van Der Lubbe

was thought to pose a “significant risk” because of the justifications put

forward for his actions.6° In the end, the Judge imposed a fine which in the

hierarchy of sentences is one step up from the conviction and discharge that

Mr Van Der Lubbe himself was seeking.’

26 August 2014

/41 Alico

Counsel for the respondent

TO: The Registrar of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.

AND TO: The appellant.

59 COA page 179

69 COA p 177

MY SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEAL

Tuesday, 9 September 2014

I stand by everything I said in my grounds and submissions for appeal and wish to add the following rebuttal to the Crown’s rebuttal.

But first I ask the Court’s permission to correct an incomplete sentence in my submissions in support of my Appeal. On page 11 at the end of paragraph 1 where it concludes, “From that time on whenever Poynter didn’t want to answer a question with a provable lie.”

The sentence should continue and conclude with the words, he feigned memory loss.

There are a number of assertions in the Crown’s rebuttal of my submissions that need commenting on or correcting.

If I may?

PAGE 2

Relevant background

Mr Van Der Lubbe lives in Wanganui with his wife. Stephen Poynter lives

next door. The properties concerned are of a semi-rural nature.

This “semi-rural” description is misleading as the properties are both bisected by the Whanganui City boundary, two of the four residences belonging to the two parties are within the city boundary and there are no less than 28 residential properties with a radius of 200 meters of my home which is just outside the city boundary and Poynter’s is 90 meters from my home. Residential with a rural aspect would be a much better description, and semi-rural only if you ignore all the nearby houses. There have been numerous 111 calls to the Police in relation to loud gunfire by Stephen Poynter’s near and not so near neighbours other than me. Show photo if needed.

The Police established early on that the discharge of high-powered firearms in the residential/built-up area of the Paterson Street, Roberts Ave area was unlawful. SEE Jill PETTIS/ Duncan McLeod letters.

Now before I go further I wish to know why the Crown has changed the wording and meaning of a sentence in Judge McElrae’s ruling of 22 August 2012? SEE The Judges RULING 11A 31 (seven lines down) in the bundle and the Crown’s submissions page 9 19.11 (4 lines down)The Crown has substituted the word could with would and thereby changed the meaning of that sentence.

There was an ongoing dispute between the two neighbours with one of the

issues being the use of firearms by Mr Poynter. At one point, in an effort to

resolve the dispute, an arrangement was made whereby Mr Poynter would

indicate to the Police when he was about to use his firearms.

The Crown case was that on 3 August 2011 Mr Poynter rang the Police and

told them that he was going to use a firearm on his property. Mr Van Der

Lube was not advised. After Mr Poynter used his rifle Mr Van Der Lubbe

made a 111 call reporting the shots and telling the Police that someone was

shooting a gun to annoy him. The Communication Centre advised that Mr

Poynter had told Police of his intentions. At that point, Mr Van Der Lubbe,

the Crown alleged, became irate and told the communicator “…I am going to

carry out my threat now, I am going to buy my own firearm and I am going to

use it to disable my neighbour”.3

Poynter advised Police that he would be using his low-powered and suppressed 22 rifle to shoot (“retire”) pests and do home-kills. He then proceeded to use his high-powered 243 rifle to shoot four of my deer. As usual the Police did not warn me of the impending gunfire. At trial and under oath Poynter repeated the lie that he had used his suppressed 22 that night. The Police 111 recording proved that Poynter had lied to the Court but Judge Cameron simply ignored that fact. Pages 84 and 85 of the Trial transcript (5 to 30 and then over the page until the Crown interrupts again.) where Sergeant Jones tries and fails to back up Poynter’s perjury about which caliber guns he used to kill the deer. Notice how the Crown prosecutor objected at that crucial point (page 85) and it was me that Judge Cameron frowned upon and told to move on with my questioning.

But when I pressed the point that it was clear that the Sergeant wasn’t being entirely honest Judge Cameron washed his hands of the possible perjury by saying “Once again it is not for me to say that.” Judge Cameron was again allowing a Crown witnesses to make a mockery of the Court.

AND in 20 of page 85 of the transcript I indicate again that my very short term memory is faulty and if I had written it down as Judge Cameron suggested I probably would have forgotten doing that too. That obvious perjury (the lying about the use of his 22 when the police 111 recording proved otherwise) and the failure of the Police to pull Poynter up for his obvious false written statements, and the possible perjury (The Sergeant claiming that Poynter didn’t tell him what rifle he intended to fire.) is left for the accused and or the jury to action That can’t be a correct or a fair way to run a trial?

About three weeks later, on 23 August 2011, Mr Poynter advised the Police

that he was going to use his firearm on his property again. He did so but again

the information was not passed on to Mr Van Der Lubbe and at about 2.40pm

he made a 111 call advising the Police that he had heard a gunshot from his

neighbours. Mr Van Der Lubbe was advised by Police to stay inside while the

Police investigated. Mr Van Der Lubbe was telephoned by the Police a short

PAGE 3

time later and a message was left on his answerphone advising that Mr Poynter

had contacted the Police warning that he would be killing a pig. Mr Van Der

Lubbe returned the call wanting to speak to the person he had spoken to

before. He became irritated and annoyed with the Police communications

operator. He swore at him and said “You’re just fucking useless, I’m going to

buy my own gun, I am going to kill that cunt”.4

Again Poynter advised Police that he would be using his low-powered and suppressed 22 to kill a pig. He then proceeded to use his unsupressed high-powered 243 rifle to shoot the pig. As usual the Police did not warn me of the impending gunfire. At trial and under oath Poynter again repeated the lie that he had used his 22 to shoot the pig.

TRIAL Page 9 [5/10] [25/30] and page 10 [5]

At trial Mr Van Der Lubbe essentially relied on provocation and self-defence.

He admitted the telephone calls themselves.’

Mr Van Der Lubbe gave evidence. He explained that by making the telephone

calls he was laying a paper trail and that he wanted to be arrested so that he

could tell his story in Court and the gun shots could be stopped permanently!”

The Crown has stated that the Police were warned by Stephen Poynter on both shooting occasions that he was about to fire his suppressed 22 rifle and that the Police failed to pass on the warnings to me. (As I said above, Poynter actually fired his high-powered rifle on both occasions and then lied to the Police and the Court about it.)

This failure to pass on Poynter’s warnings to me, was and still is, a deliberate police policy designed to encourage me to break the Queens peace. You may think that’s crazy talk but there is no reasonable explanation for the withholding of warnings from me other than it was done as a deliberate ploy in the hope that I might retaliate in some unlawful fashion. See where it says, The Police document number 188 in the bundle proves that there is a formal Police policy to withhold Poynter’s warnings from me. SHOW COMMS RECORD, LAST PAGE.

And the entry “WE WILL WAIT AND SEE IF ANY OTHER PROBLEMS ARISE.”

shows that the Police were waiting and hoping for unlawful developments to occur.

Well they got what they waited four plus years for, in the end it was a bit tame but something was better than nothing. My plan to lessen the gunfire danger to my family was successful however so that was one excellent outcome. SEE MY LETTER TO JUDGE CAMERON 183 in the bundle. Unfortunately I was prevented from telling my full “story” to the jury by Judge Cameron, a story that I am sure would have proved that I had acted only in self-defence and only after a prolonged period of dangerous provocations. Had the Police passed on the warnings to me or better still, acted to prevent the unannounced discharge of high-powered firearms very near to my home and a residential area I would not be here today.

The learned District Court Judge, Judge Cameron, directed the jury that the

evidence given in the case was not sufficient to give rise to the possibility of

self-defence. In doing so the Judge pointed out that none of Mr Van Der

Lubbe’s responses on 3 or 23 August could be said to be reasonable defensive

responses to the situation Mr Van Der Lubbe believed existed at the time.’ The

Judge illustrated the point by indicating that on 3 August 2001 Mr Van Der

Lubbe told the Police Communications Center that someone was shooting a

gun to annoy him.’ Annoyance could not possibly justify, on any objective

basis, a response by Mr Van Der Lubbe of a threat to disable the person

concerned.9

When taken in isolation the two firearms incidents may not appear to give sufficient rise to the possibility of a self-defense response but add them to it the heap of evidence that those two incidents were only the culmination of a four plus years campaign of intimidation and harassment, all condoned by the complicit Wanganui Police there is more than enough justification for one or more acts of reasonable self-defense. THE POLICE COMMS ENTRY “not any of his business” etc (Document 188 in the bundle) is but one of the many proofs that the Wanganui Police were complicit in Poynter’s harrasment campaign. The cover-up of the cat shooting and dangerous shooting incident and the alleged cattle theft are examples of that complicity. In the latter incident the Sergeant who obtained the search warrant did so under false pretences. He swore out an application for a search warrant knowing that a crucial detail in it was false. He falsely swore that I was the designated owner of 22A Paterson Street when he had already established at the Wanganui City Council Offices that my wife is the designated owner of 22A Patterson St.

In relation to provocation, the Judge directed the jury that provocation is not a

defence to the charges Mr Van Der Lubbe faced but if accepted could and

would be taken into account in imposing sentence should he be found guilty:0

If provocation was not a defense to the charges why was Judge McElrae so emphatic in the wording of his ruling of 24 August 2012 that I must be allowed to present evidence showing that my family had been the victims of a three decades long period of discrimination and provocation at the hands of the Police and their criminal accomplices, such as the so called “victim” Stephen Poynter. See Judge McElrae’s ruling. 11A [31] of the bundle.

I believe Judge Cameron was wrong to overrule Judge McElrae and rule out provocation as a defense to the charges and his assertion that my use of the word annoy rather than provoke in my phone conversation with Police on the night of 3 August 2011 was proof that I was not feeling provoked shows that he was actually unsure if provocation was a defense to the charges or not. Where would Judge Cameron have been had I used the word provoke rather than “annoy” on the night that Poynter woke me up from my sleep with high-powered gunfire? Annoy and provoke mean the same thing anyway so Judge Cameron was wrong on all counts.

Crown has chosen to parrot Judge Cameron here MIDDLE of PAGE 168 of the bundle by saying that my use of the word annoy instead of provoke is proof that I wasn’t genuine when I claimed that I felt threatened or provoked by Stephen Poynter’s unannounced gunfire. That of course is total hogwash. From day one in 2006 I pleaded with the Police to stop Poynter from firing his “cannons” near me, I even approached the local MP Jill Pettis for help and repeatedly asked the police to establish a no fire zone along the common boundary. SHOW Jill PETTIS LETTERS AGAIN This evidence of my concern was dismissed by Judge Cameron as hearsay, irrelevant and inadmissible without him even looking at it.

It was abundantly clear to all who actually bothered to look that I was very worried about the danger that the unannounced gunfire posed, so much so that I believe the prolonged stress of it all ultimately lead to my heart attack. The Jury questions made it abundantly clear that they wanted to acquit me on the grounds of self-defence, provocation and or intent but Judge Cameron misdirected them on the blatantly false grounds that provocation was not a defence, that self-defence was also not a defence in this matter and that therefore my intent must have been criminal.

PROVOCATION PAGE 169 11

PAGE 4

Appeal jurisdiction

Mr Van Der Lubbe’s prosecution was commenced by way of informations

filed on 29 February 2012 prior to the commencement of the second stage of

the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 on 1 July 2013. The appeal therefore is to be

determined under part 13 of the Crimes Act 1961.11

Suppression orders

The Crown are not aware of any suppression orders in this matter.

Appellant’s warning status

The appellant, Mr Van Der Lubbe, has no strikes recorded against him.

The appeal

The argument on appeal is essentially that the learned District Court Judge was

biased against Mr Van Der Lubbe and that accordingly there was a miscarriage

of justice. The sentence is said to be excessive in that the Judge did not take

into account the provocation Mr Van Der Lubbe alleged he had been

subjected to.

The argument on appeal is about judicial bias but it is also about how Judge Cameron suppressed large portions of my police misconduct evidence and misdirected the Jury about self-defense, provocation and intent. And to use the word “alleged” when talking about Stephen Poynter’s years long provocation and harassment campaign is a lot like the Crown changing the wording in Judge McElrae’s ruling in an attempt to mislead this Court.

Bias

The Crown submits that the way in which the learned District Court Judge

conducted the trial would not create a reasonable apprehension about his

impartiality for any fair minded observer.12 Trial judges benefit from a

presumption of integrity which in turn encompasses the notion of impartiality.

The onus is therefore on the person alleging bias to present coherent

evidence.’

There is ample evidence that Judge Cameron was openly biased against me from day one. I should have applied to have him stand down from the case there and then but I guess I was already feeling a bit intimidated. It took an Application to the High Court to convince Judge Cameron that his decision to deny me sufficient time to prepare my defence was indefencible and so he vacated the early trial date but he gave me no reason for having done so. I now realise that at that time I inadvertantly made the mistake of informing the Judge what my defence stratergy was going to be. SEE Deputy Registrar V L Manning DATED 20 July 2012 AND ALSO SEE HIGH COURT APPLICATION DATED 30 July 2012.

Mr Van Der Lubbe essentially relies on the Court record to make out the

grounds of his appeal. It is submitted that Mr Van Der Lubbe has not

discharged the onus on him to present cogent evidence of bias.

Rather, the picture which emerges from the case on appeal and notes of

evidence is that the Judge had to make a sequence of rulings against Mr Van

Der Lubbe because:

That’s claptrap and he knows it.

PAGE 5

18.1 Mr Van Der Lubbe sought to introduce extensive background to the

dispute with his neighbour as evidence when it was unrelated to any

available defence or matter in dispute. The rulings were against Mr

Van Der Lubbe because his position had no legal basis; and

Judge McElrae stated very firmly in [31] of his ruling of 24 August 2012 that I must be permitted to try and prove the decades long pattern of Police malfeasance against my family which led directly to me having to take the self-defence actions that I did on the days in question. The evidence that I was prevented from presenting to the Court was directly related to the available defense of self-defence and Judge Cameron’s attitude towards me was encapsulated in his use of the word “venting” to describe my wish to defend myself by demonstrating the exisistance of a decades long pattern of Police misconduct. I thought that this “venting” business was in the Trial transcript but I was mistaken. Proof that the exchange took place is in a separate “Ruling” dated 12 March 2013. The word “venting” is on page one, and page 2 reveals that I asked for and was refused a mistrial on the grounds that I wasn’t getting a fair trial, and the last sentence reveals that because of Judge Cameron’s unfair overruling of Judge McElrae my defense was thrown into disarray. “I’ve got no idea where to start.” This is the point where my defence case was irreparably damaged by Judge Cameron overruling of Judge McElrae’s earlier ruling upon which I based my self-defense case. Again on page 10 of his 24 August 2012 [41] and [42] ruling, (that’s 12A of the bundle) Judge MCElrae made it absolutely clear that my self-defence case relied on me being allowed to present my “extensive evidence” of police malfeasance against my family. SEE JUDGE CAMERON’S RULING DATED 12 MARCH 2013 135 of the bundle at the bottom where I say, “I’ve got no idea where to start.”

And how on earth is an extensive background to the dispute with his neighbour Poynter not evidence and not related to any available defense or matter in dispute?

18.2 Mr Van Der Lubbe was self-represented. Many of the interventions

and rulings made by the Judge were necessary because Mr Van Der

Lubbe chose to represent himself before the Court in a jury trial. The

Judge was entitled to intervene to maintain control of the Court room

he had an implied power to do what was necessary in the exercise

of his trial function.”

Most of the interventions and rulings made by Judge Cameron were at the behest of the Crown Prosecutor who had his own dishonest agenda. The fact that I represented myself had no bearing on the frequency of the Crown’s interruptions to the Court’s process but it had everything to do with denying me a fair trial. One example being that the Crown and Judge Cameron let me paint myself into a very bad light before the Crown Prosecutor objected and Judge Cameron forbade me from adding further evidence that would have changed that picture altogether. If the Crown was genuine about keep things “relevant” then it would have interjected after I said 1987. SHOW TRANSCRIPT………….PAGE 96 [5] [10] of the bundle.

Please refer to page 2 of Judge JP Clapham’s Judgement for his opinion of some of the matters that Judge Cameron dismissed as “irrelevant” to my defence. SHOW JUDGE CLAPHAM’S JUDGEMENT. 26A [12] through to [15] of the bundle.

Mr Van Der Lubbe’s specific concerns can be considered as follows:

Reasonable dineframe to prepare defence

19.1 Mr Van Der Lubbe asserts that he had inadequate time to prepare his

defence and that the Judge had “an arrogant and dismissive

demeanour”.15 The onus on Mr Van Der Lubbe to present cogent

evidence is not discharged here and there is nothing in the record

before this Court to support the assertion. In any event, it seems that

the early trial date was later vacated. I6

There is nothing in the Court record about Judge Cameron’s arrogant and dismissive

demeanor” because preliminary hearings are not recorded but my application to the High Court to overrule Judge Cameron’s oppressive early trial date and Judge Cameron’s unexplained and reluctant vacating of the early trial date is more than enough “cogent” evidence that my claim that Judge Cameron’s demeanor was not what an impartial adjudicator would display……………………..SHOW CAMERON”S REFUSAL TO VACATE THE EARLY TRIAL DATED 20 July 2012. THE MANNING LETTER

Witnesses

19.2 The implication of Mr Van Der Lubbe’s submission on this point” is

that the Judge wrongly enquired into the names of Mr Van Der

Lubbe’s witnesses. The innuendo is that the attendance of the

witnesses was then discouraged (presumably by the Crown).18

19.3 Again, there is no cogent evidence for this and there is no reflection

in the record of this exchange. In setting the trial date the Judge may

well have sought the number or names of witnesses and may or may

not have advised Mr Van Der Lubbe that he was not required to

notify the Court if he did not want to.

PAGE SIX

19.4 The suggestion that the Crown then went on to discourage the

attendance of the witnesses or encouraged one of them to ‘change his

story’19 is a very serious allegation and completely without evidential

foundation.

That I was asked for my witnesse’s names cannot be disputed by the Crown as preliminary hearings are not recorded. Judge Clapham stated in an earlier decision that I am “not a liar” so the “onus” is on the Crown to prove otherwise. It has to prove that the exchange did not happen as described. I have no doubt that seeking the number of potential witnesses is normal Court practice but asking for their names and writing them down has different connotations altogether. Names are only required if vetting or something else is being contemplated. SHOW CLAPHAM’S WORDS NOT A LIAR PAGE 38A [53] of the bundle.

19.5 In any event, it does not seem that any arrest warrants were sought by

Mr Van Der Lubbe when his witnesses did not attend. The

prosecutor’s note of the trial shows that at 3.10pm (on 12 March

2013) Mr Steele’s evidence concluded and that there were “3 other

witnesses.”‘ The note then states “none show up”.

Judge Cameron didn’t mention to me that I could have asked for an adjournment or that my no-show witnesses could be arrested and brought to Court. I imagine that an Amicus would have reminded Judge Cameron of my right to call for an adjournment.

When I went to file my duplicate witness summonses, (I had served the originals myself) the Court counter staff person said, “What am I supposed to do with these?” I replied that I wanted them stamped and added to the file. She then made an exaggerated display of stamping the summonses and walked off without further conversation. Can you imagine Judge Cameron stopping the trial so that my missing witness could be arrested and dragged into Court? Anyway, I didn’t know that that could have been done and Judge Cameron did not alert me to the possibility.

21 The note goes

on to say that at 3.12pm “Defence case ends”

22 No application for a warrant to bring the absent witnesses to Court or for an adjournment is noted as having been made. In the case on appeal it is simply noted

that the final defence witness, Mr Steele, was excused

23 and the defence case was concluded. There were no applications for warrants

or adjournments at that point.

I’ve already covered that point.

And my summonsed witnessBruce Steel was excused after I told Judge Cameron that he had changed his story from what he had told me earlier.